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Abstract 
The concept of club convergence has been widely used in empirical analysis to 
group countries in clubs with similar development paths. However, there is no 
unified agreement on how to identify the clubs in the first place. In this paper, I 
argue that economic history can guide us to identify clubs. The argument is that 
economic history helps us understand when, where, and how institutions are formed 
and since institutions determine the way scarce resources are used by their chosen 
policies, it allows us to understand economic growth. Even though Latin America is 
typically considered a club itself, due to common characteristics, such as language, 
geography, religion and history, it still exhibits differences across countries. I study 
a period of more than 100 years, from 1900 to 2007, where first, I identify two main 
common external shocks to the region: the Great Depression in the 1930s and the 
oil price shock in 1974. Second, I classify countries in clubs according, first, to their 
natural resources endowments, and then, after each shock, to their policy-response 
to the shocks. Lastly, I test convergence within each club. I find significant and 
positive convergence speed within each of the clubs, implying that this way of 
finding clubs should not be ruled out. 
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1 Introduction 
The detection of income disparities across clubs of economies can help determine how to speed up 
the process of economic development and understand the sources of differences in growth 
performances. In theory, the reasons behind club convergence could be several, among these: the 
existence of some threshold level in the endowment of strategic factors of production, non-
convexities or increasing returns, similarities in preferences and technologies, and government 
policies and institutions (Canova, 2004; and Azariadis, 1996). Empirically, there is no unified 
agreement on how to identify clubs. Most researchers (e.g. Durlauf and Johnson, 1995; Paap and 
Van Dijk, 1998; Desdoigts, 1998; Hansen, 2000; Canova, 2004; Owen, et al., 2009) lean towards 
the approach of letting the data decide the clubs. They usually study the shape of the distribution of 
income (or capital) and focus on finding an income (or capital) threshold to divide countries into 
clubs, or the thresholds are determined beforehand. However, the division of clubs by income (or 
capital) is not very informative with respect to the forces behind the heterogeneity in income (or 
capital) in first place.  
Although Latin America is typically considered a club itself, due to its common characteristics, 
such as language, geography, religion, history and policies, it exhibits differences across countries 
(see Figure 1). Dispersion in GDP per capita has been increasing on average over the period 1950-
2005 in Latin America, whereas it has been decreasing among the OECD countries.  Then a relevant 
question is, Why diversity in growth trajectories in a region with so many common roots? Some 
candidates for an explanation come to mind: commodity lottery/geography, poor market integration, 
colonial heritage, and differences in economic policies, among others. 
Some researchers have gone far in time to explain the diversity in development paths in Latin 
America and the connection to institutions. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) find that there 
is a strong correlation between early institutions and institutions today. In the specific case of the 
Americas they distinguish between regions that were settled by Europeans and regions that, due to 
high settler mortality, the Europeans established “extractive states” instead. The latter model paved 
the way for extractive states even after political independence in the nineteenth century. In a later 
work, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 114-115) restate their point that the extractive political 
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and economic institutions of the conquistadors have endured and condemned much of the region to 
poverty. There are, however exceptions. Argentina and Chile have fared better than most. Because 
they had few indigenous people or mineral riches (exploitable at the time) they were “neglected” by 
the Spanish. Consequently, there are differences even in this dismal picture of colonial heritage. 
Similarly, Engermann and Sokoloff (2002) argue that institutions are endogenous, and that the roots 
of the disparities in the extent of the inequality that we observe today lay in the initial factor 
endowments. Through comparative studies of suffrage, public land and schooling policies they 
document systematic patterns by which the societies in the Americas, that began with more extreme 
inequality or heterogeneity in the population were more likely to develop institutional structures that 
greatly advantaged members of the elite by providing them with more political influence and access 
to economic opportunities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. GDP per capita dispersion in the World, OECD, Latin America and eight Latin American countries 
(LA8 - Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela). Standard deviation of the 
logarithm of GDP per capita. 
Empirical research on convergence in Latin America is still scarce compared to other regions1, 
and only one other study incorporates economic history features into the analysis: Astorga et al. 
(2005). They do a time-series analysis for each of their six countries of study, during 1900-2000, 
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 There are only nine cross-country studies on convergence: Blyde, 2005 and 2006; Holmes, 2005; Astorga et. al.,  2005; 
Dobson and Ramlogan, 2002a and 2002b; Utrera, 1999; Dabus and Zinni, 2005; and Madariaga et.al, 2003. 
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where they find different breaks for each of them. They conclude that there are two external shocks 
affecting the six economies simultaneously: in the 1930s due to the Great Depression and in the 
1980s due to the shift in US monetary policy and debt crises2. They find convergence between the 
six countries by using panel data and error correction models, and conclude, among other things, 
that there is convergence among the six countries but it seems there is divergence between the rest, 
forming two distinct convergence clubs (they do not test for this). They say that the "rest" show an 
inferior pattern of growth compared to the six, due to lower growth rate and greater vulnerability, 
which may possibly relate their greater vulnerability to the external shocks. 
 This study pretends as well, to answer the question posted earlier of why diversity in growth 
trajectories in a region with common roots and fill in the gap in the literature by analyzing, 
empirically, the existence of club convergence in 32 Latin American countries over more than 100 
years,  more than any other study.   
I analyze club formation in a different way than the conventional procedures (income or capital 
threshold determination) and incorporate the institution link to growth.  I examine sources of 
heterogeneity on the basis of economic history, which informs us on the different initial 
endowments, the most important common external shocks and the policy-responses. Such historical 
events shape the way institutions are formed, and institutions determine the way scarce resources 
are used. As mentioned by Easterly (2003), technology is endogenous to the institutions that make 
adoption of better production techniques likely. The institution link in terms of Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2012) and Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) enters in the analysis when I, first, divide the 
clubs according to their factor endowments. However, after the external shocks hit the region, a mix 
of countries of different endowments try to change their pattern of development while others remain 
in the same path. In other words, I recognize that there is a legacy from the colonizers but I also 
accept that external shocks and certain circumstances can also change this legacy by the decision 
and possibilities of the policy makers.  
The criteria of division of clubs follow three steps.  First, I identify the main common external 
shocks that changed the development patterns in the region: the Great Depression in 1930s and the 
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 However, from my point of view, the shift in US monetary policy and debt crises are consequences of the exogenous 
shock of the increase in oil prices in 1974. 
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oil price shock in 1974. Then, I classify countries in clubs according to first, their initial endowment 
of natural resources and then according to their policy-response to the shocks. Here, I focus on 
information of the policies rather than outcomes so that the results are not driven by the selection of 
the club thresholds in the first place. Finally, I test for convergence within each club. 
Before 1930, I define two clubs according to their exporting product: the mineral and 
agricultural producers. After the Great Depression I follow Diaz (1984) classification of clubs, 
according to passive or reactive countries, where the reactive responded autonomously to protect 
themselves, while the passive did/could not. After the oil price shock, I classify the clubs according 
to the Lora index (Lora, 2001), which describes to what extent countries applied structural reforms 
to liberalize their economies. I also have the Caribbean countries as a separate club.  
In connection to growth theory, under multiple-equilibria models, each historical watershed 
represents an opportunity to modify the set of initial conditions and to escape from a development 
trap, whereas in the Solow model approach, those historical points represent critical changes in 
policy parameters and a redefinition of the steady state. The empirical analysis cannot distinguish 
between these two kinds of models. 
The following section discusses the background of the paper. First it discusses the theoretical 
aspects behind club convergence, then it summarizes the prior research in Latin America, and 
finally it reviews the common economic history events in the region.  Section 3 describes the 
empirical specification of the paper, which consists of the division of clubs and the econometric 
specification. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 discusses the strengths and weaknesses of 
the approach. Finally, I present the conclusions. The data details are presented in the appendix. 
 
2 Background 
2.1 Connection to theory: from the Solow-Swan model to multiple 
equilibrium models 
The concept of economic convergence has been discussed through many years since Ramsey 
(1928) until now. This section does not pretend to do an exhaustive summary and analysis of all 
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growth theories3, but instead it discusses and compares, in general terms and briefly, the two most 
important theories behind club convergence that emerge from the most basic version of Solow-
Swan model and the multiple equilibria models. 
The neoclassical growth models, of which the simplest version is Ramsey-Solow model, arrive 
at a growth equation where convergence can be estimated by4, 
 
 . log	(/) =  −

 ∙ log	(
∗/) +                 (1) 
 
where the average growth rate in the interval from 0 to T for country i,   . log	(/), is 
related negatively to the initial output  in relation to the steady state output ∗, and positively to 
the technology growth x, while keeping β (speed of convergence) and T (period) constant. 
Equation (1) describes conditional β-convergence in the sense that a poor country A will grow 
faster than rich country B, understanding that country A is poorer because it is further away from its 
own steady-state than country B is.  In contrast, absolute β-convergence assumes that ∗is the same 
for country A and B,  ∗ = ∗. We cannot know exactly what the steady state output looks like, but 
we know it is related to structural characteristics such as technologies, preferences, propensity to 
save, institutions, policies, etc.  
Empirically, one can estimate β-conditional convergence by finding proxies for the steady state5 
or by grouping economies that we assume have the same steady state (Sala-i-Martin, 1996). So, if 
we gather countries that have or we expect to have similar steady-states we are finding (or testing 
for) convergence in different groups, namely group convergence. 
On the other hand, the multiple equilibria models starting with Azariadis and Drazen (1990) 
(and followed by many others, see Durlauf and Quah, 1999) advocate for multiple regime in which 
different economies obey different linear models when grouped according to different initial 
conditions.  For example, there exists a range of human or physical capital levels over which the 
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 Durlauf and Quah (1999) offer a great summary of economic growth theories and empirics 
4
 Basically, from a Cobb-Douglas production function for the economy, and a Utility function for a representative agent, the 
economy will eventually arrive to a steady state, where the economy cannot grow anymore. Equation (1) is the resulting 
equation after optimization and log-linearlization (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) for the derivations). 
5
 However, the problem of adding controls as proxies for the steady-state,  is that these will probably be endogenous 
(Durlaug and Quah, 1999). 
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aggregated production function is not concave which will lead to different long-run steady-states. In 
this way, initial conditions can “trap” countries into not reaching the rich countries.  
Azariadis (1996) and Canova (2004) suggest that the potential causes of traps are several, like 
technologies, preferences, market structures, fertility patterns and public policies. These variables 
preserve and augment initial inequality in per capita income among otherwise identical national 
economies.  This concept is called club convergence. 
Unfortunately, economic theory does not guide us on the number of clubs or the way in which 
the different variables defining initial conditions interact in determining the clubs. To address this 
issue, most researchers (e.g. Durlauf and Johnson, 1995; Bai, 1997; Hansen, 2000; Pesaran, 2006; 
Paap van Dijk,1998; and Desdoigts, 1998) lean towards the approach of letting the data decide the 
clubs. They usually study the shape of the distribution of income per capita and focus on finding an 
income threshold to divide clubs; however they may not be able to explain the differences in income 
or capital in first place. 
The difference between group convergence and club convergence lies on their assumption about 
stratification. Group convergence assumes the stratification is due to different steady states, while 
club convergence assumes that the stratification comes from interactions on initial conditions with 
different variables. Empirically, both can be estimated from Equation (1).  
2.2 Prior research in Latin America 
In Latin America, there are only nine cross-country empirical studies6 on convergence (Blyde, 
2005 and 2006; Holmes, 2005; Astorga, et.al 2005; Dobson and Ramlogan, 2002a and 2002b; 
Utrera, 1999; Dabus and Zinni, 2005; and Madariaga et.al,2003). Although they analyze the same 
region, they study different countries and periods, and apply different methodologies. 
Some of the authors use methodologies that do not measure a specific speed of convergence, 
such as Blyde (2006), who studies 21 countries during 1960-2004 and uses a distribution dynamics 
approach. He finds that countries are converging to two clubs; one large for low and low-middle 
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 The number of studies within a given country is higher than across countries, and usually concentrated in few countries, 
such as Chile, Argentina, Brazil and Colombia (e.g. Marina (2001), Azzoni et al.(2001), Anriquez and Fuentes (2001), 
Cardenas and Ponton (1995), Magalhaes, Hewings and Azzoni (2005), Serra et al.(2006)). 
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income countries and another small for rich-income countries. The high-income countries are 
Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, and Mexico, and the remaining 17 countries are in the other club.  
Dobson, Goddard and Ramoglan (2003) study the case of 24 countries during 1965-1998 by 
using cross-section analysis and unit root with panel data tests, and find convergence but not a 
specific speed nor different clubs. Other researchers find concrete results but no clubs.  For 
example, Dobson and Ramlogan (2002a and b) study 19 countries and 28 and 30 years, respectively 
(1970-1998 and 1960-1990), using cross-section regression and panel data analysis, and find speeds 
of convergence of 0.02% to 2%7. Helliwell (1992) analyzes 18 Latin American countries over the 
period 1960-1985 and finds convergence at a speed of 2.5%8. 
The only other study that incorporates economic history features into their analysis is Astorga et 
al., 2005. They first do a time series analysis for each of their six countries of study, during 1900-
2000, where they find different breaks for each of them. They conclude that there are two external 
shocks affecting the six economies simultaneously: in the 1930s due to the Great Depression and in 
1980s due to the shift in US monetary policy and debt crises9. Later, they find convergence between 
the six using panel data and error correction models, at a speed between 1% and 1.9%, where the 
oscillation comes from the addition or subtraction of explicative variables that proxy for the steady 
state10. They conclude, among other things, that there is convergence among the six countries but it 
seems there is divergence between the rest, forming two distinct convergence clubs (they do not test 
for this). They say that the "rest" show an inferior pattern of growth compared to the six, due to 
lower growth rate and greater vulnerability, which may possibly relate their greater vulnerability to 
the external shocks. 
In stark contrast to these findings of relatively low speeds of convergence, Dabus and Zinni 
(2005) analyze 23 countries from 1960 to 1998, and find absolute and very high conditional 
convergence rates. The authors argue that once controls are introduced and extremely high speeds of 
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 Their studies include, as proxies for the steady state, sectorial decomposition variables, country dummies, population 
growth, savings, and human capital. 
8
 He includes variables such as investments, population growth, human capital, and scale effects. 
9
 However, from my point of view, the shift in US monetary policy and debt crises are consequences the exogenous shock 
of the increase in oil prices in 1974. 
10
 They include human capital, external, institutional, and economic variables, together with dummy variables related to 
external events, such as the Great Depression and the Debt Crises. The countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, and Venezuela. 
9 
 
conditional convergence are found, compared to absolute convergence, then it is a signal of 
divergence. This is a good point, since when controlling for many characteristics, a hypothetical 
speed of convergence is being calculated, while the real speed of convergence would be the one 
closest to absolute convergence11. They conclude that convergence of any type is absent in Latin 
America. 
2.3 Economic history of the region  
To analyze the economic history of 32 countries during more than 100 years is a complicated 
task, and even more so when one wants to focus on the common factors of the region as a whole 
rather than country specific sets of events. Historians face this task, and one of the main references 
for my analysis in this section is Thorp (1998), who captures in depth the comparative reality within 
Latin America. 
Below, I describe the common events and focus on two very important external shocks that have 
changed the development patterns in the region: the Great Depression of 1930 and the oil crisis in 
1974. The first shock changed the political economy of the region, and as a result many of the 
countries underwent a process of import substitution industrialization. The second shock, too, 
changed the political economy of the region, resulting in a debt crisis, to which the response in 
many cases was to adopt structural reforms to liberalize the economies. Thus, the pattern changed 
from initially exporting, to substituting imports with the state playing an important role, and finally 
liberalizing and a lowering the role of the state. 
1900-1930: The Exporting Phase 
There is no doubt that during the first phase of the 20th century the economics of the region was 
characterized by being dependent on exports, which were primary products with low value added. 
The region was vulnerable to world income and to fluctuations in primary products prices.  
The first phase is characterized by the world export demand being high and the capital flows 
being fluent to the region. These two facts determined the way Latin America developed. The 
                                                           
11
 In this regard, Durlauf and Quah (1999) mention that the choice of the steady-state proxies depends on the interest of 
the researcher and this can lead to wrong results. 
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region exported the needed primary products and at the same time imported more elaborated goods 
produced in the "center". 
WWI (1914-1918) accelerated the shift in trade and investment structures in the region. The 
demand for Latin America’s exports increased, and according to Furtado (1981) the war stimulated 
the industrial growth in the region, especially in the mineral countries. The economic pattern and the 
political economy did not change after WWI, but they did when the Great Depression hit the region. 
1930: The Great Depression 
In 1929 the US stock market crashed and provoked a fall in economic activity in the 
industrialized countries, which in turn reduced their demand for primary products and reversed the 
capital flows to Latin America. This situation deteriorated the terms of trade of all primary products, 
leading to an increase of the Latin American real import prices. The natural mechanism of 
adjustment is a decrease in real export prices so that demand is stimulated again, but due to the 
extreme circumstances of the Great Depression, world demand could not recover. Instead, Latin 
American demand went from imported manufactured goods to domestic manufactured products. 
This process stimulated the import substitution phase of Latin America. Cardoso and Helwege 
(1992) call it "import substitution by default". 
The process of industrialization via import substitution was reinforced by WWII (1939-1945). 
Although WWII brought an increase of Latin American exports, there were constraints on imports. 
Consequently, the scarcity of imports and the deterioration of terms of trade of primary products 
encouraged new efforts to substitute imports, but these efforts were in turn limited by scarcity of 
imported inputs and capital goods. National governments promoted industries and restricted 
imports, mainly by lowering interest rates, giving easy credits, and controlling prices. Capital 
inflows were attracted through loans to the public sector. Moreover, governments applied multiple 
exchange rates, protective tariffs, import licenses, and different import quotas that could favor the 
essential goods imports and reduce final goods imports. 
As a result of the protection of the national markets, the exporting sectors in many countries in 
Latin America were discouraged due to high cost of domestic intermediate products, and the 
restriction on imports demand overvalued the exchange rates, making prices less competitive. 
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Moreover, fiscal revenues from the commodity product sector went down and public spending rose, 
creating a fiscal gap, which in some cases was monetized and later created persistent inflation. The 
result was detrimental for sectors that were not intensive in capital, like the agricultural sectors and 
the artisans. Finally, the low interest rates given by the government to promote investments 
discouraged saving even when helping inefficient firms and corruption increased greatly. However, 
for those countries where industrialization was strong, innovations were made in terms of 
organization, technology and R&D (together with investment in education), like in Brazil, 
Argentina and Mexico. Another positive side was that some enterprises were ready to export. 
Overall, more manufactured goods were produced. 
1974: Oil Price Shock 
Later, in 1974, the shock of the increase in oil prices led Latin America to become highly 
indebted, which led to a debt crises in the region. The mechanism is described by Cardoso & 
Helwege (1992) as follows: "..Oil exporters deposited their earnings in the commercial banks of 
developed countries, but higher oil prices caused a recession in OECD countries and reduced the 
demand for credit. Left with excessive liquidity bankers eagerly lent to the Third World at very low 
interest rates.." . 
The debt crises started in 1979 and 1981 when the Unites States and other OECD countries kept 
their money supply tight and increased interest rates radically. Since countries acquired loans at 
floating interest rates, their debt obligations increased very much12. The adjustment of the debt 
crises was costly for all countries in the region, mainly due to the massive capital outflow. 
Governments were not able to continue their policies and had to make drastic changes. In general, 
governments printed more money to cover or keep their fiscal deficits constant. With all the 
borrowed money, governments were used to spending more than their incomes. Since printing 
money can cause inflation pressures and damage real wages, some governments indexed the 
nominal wages to prices to keep real wages constant. Speculators, trying to earn from the 
indexation, raised prices at higher rates than salaries. Sooner or later inflation exploded into 
hyperinflation and governments were no longer able to manage it. 
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 The average real interest rate on LDC debt rose from -6% in 1981 to 14.6% in 1982 (Thorp, 1998). 
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Countries were desperate to stabilize and gain access to foreign credit again, and the 
"Washington Consensus policy package" was an option to reach stabilization. The package was a 
set of structural reforms to liberalize the economy. The specific policies were to cut budget deficits 
(by reducing expenses and increasing taxes), privatize, liberalize imports, impose exchange controls 
(devaluate), eliminate price controls (to reflect the real costs), and increase interest rates (Cardoso & 
Helwege, 1992). Some countries took the package as such, and others took some elements of it. 
However, in general the adjustment left behind common problems that reinforced each other, such 
as capital outflows, fiscal deficits, inflation, overvaluation, and balance of payment crises. 
Later, in the 90’s, some trends of thought support the idea that good institutions create 
complementarities between productivity growth and equality. Others maintain that policies that are 
linked to the political constituency will create a combination of economic and social development. 
When the population participates in the process of making decisions, the feeling of ownership helps 
to monitor and accomplish their obligations better. Thorp calls these new currents "the New 
Paradigm Shift", which started by the mid 1990s, as a response to the poor welfare results. Thorp 
points out that the rise of the paradigm shift is a result of the increasing capital flows, the debt 
crises, and the costly adjustment process. However, it is hard to attribute the results to either 
globalization or policy shifts alone. 
3 Empirical Specification 
The previous section described how the political economy changed from initially exporting, to 
substituting imports with a great role played by the state, and finally to liberalizing and a 
diminishing the role of the state. These changes are clearly radical, and according to multiple 
equilibria models, each historical watershed is an opportunity to modify the set of initial conditions 
and to escape from a development trap and according to Solow-Swan model, each political change 
will result in different steady-states.  
     I focus on a criterion to divide countries into clubs that describe the initial conditions after the 
shocks, as under the multiple-equilibria models. The criterion is based on the policies adopted at the 
beginning of each phase, as a response to the shock. I focus on information of policies rather than of 
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outcomes so the results are not driven by the selection of the club thresholds in the first place13. I 
explain first the club division and later the econometric specification. 
3.1 Division of Clubs 
Mineral and Agricultural Clubs: 1900-1930 
For the first phase, the initial conditions are defined in terms of type of natural resource 
endowment. Due to lack of data in this phase, I divide countries into groups according to mineral vs. 
agricultural countries, rather than a more extensive type of division by product. 
Agricultural countries’ production was vulnerable to natural disasters, and minerals were 
vulnerable to recessions in the "center", because minerals were used in construction, machinery, and 
chemicals production. Moreover, the two types of production had different spillovers. For instance, 
the mining sector was characterized by using less land and labor with more capital and 
technological intensity, and having different transport needs than the agricultural sector. Acemoglu 
et.al (2001) also points out that the mining countries set more extractive institutions. 
The agricultural countries are: Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Ecuador, Cuba, Argentina, and Uruguay. They were mainly producing 
coffee, bananas, cacao, sugar, meat, and/or wheat. Those mainly producing coffee were Brazil, 
Colombia14, El Salvador and Nicaragua. Costa Rica and Guatemala were mainly producing coffee 
and bananas, while Honduras was producing bananas and precious metals. Cuba mainly produced 
sugar, but also tobacco. Argentina and Uruguay were mainly producing meat and wheat. 
The mineral countries numbered four: Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. They exported 
mainly petroleum and copper. Petroleum was produced by all except Chile, and copper was 
produced by all except Venezuela. Before 1917, Venezuela was mainly producing coffee and cacao, 
but after that year petroleum became the most important source of revenue15. Mexico was the most 
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 In Barrientos (2010), I actually analyzed different clubs in the region based on the outcomes rather than the policies. 
14
 Colombia also exported gold (Antioquia region) besides coffee but I keep it in the agricultural group because coffee has 
been more traditional. 
15
 It is debatable whether Venezuela is among the mineral countries, since its oil was discovered more in the middle than at 
the beginning of the phase. Still, I decided to keep it in the mineral club, because since its oil discovery, Venezuela has been 
dependent on its petroleum. 
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diversified export country in Latin America, also exporting lead, zinc, silver, gold, coffee, rubber, 
and cotton. It discovered its oil in 1910. 
Reactive and Passive Clubs : 1931-1974 
After the onset of the Great Depression in 1930, countries responded in different ways. Díaz 
(1984) divides countries into reactive and passive. The reactive countries had policy autonomy in 
the sense that they could, for example, depreciate their exchange rate and thereby speed up the 
relative price adjustment to recover faster, while the passive countries had to stay tied to the dollar. 
Also monetary and fiscal policies were employed. Some countries were not included in Díaz (1984), 
so I use Taylor (1999) to complete the clubs. Those countries that did some sort of exchange rate 
control and market activity control were included in the reactive club16. 
Díaz (1984) classified as reactive countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, 
and Uruguay. I added to this group six countries that were not mentioned by Diaz (1984) but by 
Taylor (1999): Bolivia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Venezuela. According to Table 3 in 
Taylor (1999), these countries exerted some sort of exchange rate control and/or some sort of 
control of capital market activity.   
Diaz (1984) has the following passive countries: Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Haiti, 
Panama, and Puerto Rico. I added Ecuador, Guatemala, and El Salvador, following Taylor (1999). 
Low and High Reformers Clubs: 1975-2007 
After the oil prices shock in 1974, countries went into debt crises, and the policy decision was 
whether to follow the structural reforms proposed by the Washington consensus or not. The change 
in policies was very radical in the region. Many countries went from protection of national markets 
and great control by the state to policies that facilitate the operation of markets and reduction of the 
distorting effects of state intervention in economic activities. Lora (2012) develops an index that 
tries to capture how deep the reforms went (rather than outcomes). The higher the index, the more 
market friendly the reforms. The index summarizes the status of progress in policies within trade, 
financial, tax, privatization, and labor areas. By using the Lora index, I classify countries into two 
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 During the second phase, a natural way of dividing clubs seems to be according to whether countries were industrialized 
or not. However, this approach would divide clubs by result more than policy, and would not reflect the initial condition for 
the phase, so I rule out this possibility. 
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groups: the high reformers, whose indices are above the average, and the low reformers, whose 
indices are below average17. 
According to the Lora index the high-reformers are: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Panama, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay. I added to this group Panama and Puerto Rico, given that both have close 
relations with USA who promoted the Washington Consensus package. 
According to Lora's index, the low-reformers are: Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, and El Salvador. I added Cuba 
for obvious reasons. 
Caribbean Club 
Finally, the Caribbean countries are treated as one club, due to its own characteristics. They are 
small, dependent on USA, and are characterized by their vulnerability to capital flight and 
international interest rate changes. They are quite open18 and primary products producers. 
Additionally, Caribbean countries are exposed to natural disasters.  I include the Caribbean club in 
each phase except the first due to lack of data. 
The Caribbean group consists of many islands and English speaking countries, mainly part of 
the trade union CARICOM: The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, 
Jamaica, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. 
3.2 Econometric Specification 
The model setup follows Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), where the main interest is in 
measuring the non-linear relation between initial output and growth. Although the setup is 
developed for neoclassical growth models, it is used when measuring club convergence as well.   
I start from the absolute convergence definition: 
 =  − 
!"
#" ∙ $" +                                                      (2) 
                                                           
17
 The Lora index of structural reforms is taken from the year 1985, while phase 3 starts in 1974. I considered starting the 
last phase in 1985, but then I would be inconsistent with the previous phase, where the break was determined by an 
external shock. One could argue that the increase in US interest rates in 1979 was the external shock, but this in turn was a 
response to the oil price shock earlier. Also from 1974 to 1979 the results should not change significantly. 
18
 In the 1990s, 19 of the 26 Caribbean states had a ratio of Exports and Imports to GDP of more than 100 percent (Thorp, 
1998). 
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where subscript i refers to countries, i=1,...N and t refers to periods, t=1,...T. Each period has a 
length of %, which is determined by the availability of data19,  is the growth rate of GDP per 
capita over the period,  $" is the initial output per capita (measured in logarithms),   is a 
constant20, β is the speed of convergence if β>0 (or divergence if β<0), and  is the disturbance 
term. 
Equation (2) tells us that if β is positive, the relation between initial income and growth is 
negative, so that the poorer the country is at the beginning, the faster the growth rate, which implies 
that the differences at the beginning of the phase tend to disappear.  
Galor (1996) mentions that by adding empirically significant elements to the neoclassical growth 
model, one can analyze club convergence under the same framework, he suggests inequality 
measures as an example. So, in order to control more adequately for the initial differences, I add 
two more variables at the beginning of each period: size and ranking of each country. Size could 
give a certain advantage in the growth process, since size is associated with economic power. In a 
similar fashion, position in the distribution of income captures the relative ranking at the beginning 
of the period: 
 =  −
1 − '(!"
% ∙ $" + )*+ ∙ +$" +
,
+-
 
                                   (3) 
 
where $" is the size of a country measured by the logarithm of population and ,$"  is the 
ranking measured by the relation of each country’s output per capita to the highest output of the 
same year. 
Now, I introduce the two main external shocks discussed earlier: 
 
 =  − 
!"
#" ∙ $" +∑ *+ ∙ +$" +
,+- ∑ /0 ∙ 10$" +,0-                 (4) 
                                                           
19
 Details on τ are in the appendix. 
20
 The constant   is capturing the common effects for being in the same region as language, culture, religion, etc., and the 
common steady-state. I could have included a dummy for each country, as it is usually done in panel data studies, in order 
to include somehow each of their steady-states but that would lose the essence of the idea of the paper, which is that 
inside each club , we expect convergence to occur. Moreover, after including country-specific characteristics, we would 
probably find higher rates of convergence, which would be artificial (more on this in the discussion section). 
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where 1 is a dummy for the first phase 1900-1930,  1, for 1931-1974, and 12  for1975-2007. 
The next step is to introduce a dummy for each club. I create dummies where I combine phase 
and club characteristics. I replace the phase dummies with club dummies: 
 
 = − 
!"
#" ∙ $" + ∑ *+ ∙ +$" +
,+- ∑ 34 ∙ 54$" +64-                        (5) 
 
where 54$"  is the club dummy. In total we have eight dummies (c=1,...8) that represent the clubs 
mentioned in the previous section. In Phase 1 we have the agricultural and mineral clubs, in phase 2 
reactive and passive clubs, and in phase 3, high-market friendly and low-market friendly countries. 
Moreover, we have the Caribbean countries as a club and included for phases 2 and 3.  
Equations (2) to (5) describe general aspects for the region as a whole. Only one common β 
coefficient is included. So, after controlling for the different dummy characteristics, we get one beta 
for the entire region. Additionally, we can see the significance of each club in the overall growth 
and compare their contribution. 
Next, I focus on finding different β coefficients, one for each club. I first calculate a similar 
version of Equations (2) and (3) with a different β for each group: 
 
 =  − 7
∑ 89	∙:9;<
=9>? ∙@<	
A< ⋅ y;< + uEF                               (6) 
  
 
 =  − 7
∑ 89	∙:9;<
=9>? ∙@<	
A< ⋅ y;< +∑ *+ ∙ +$" +
,+- uEF                      (7) 
 
    and then adding the phase dummies to Equations (6) and (7): 
 
 = − 7
∑ 89	∙:9;<
=9>? ∙@<	
A< ⋅ y;< + ∑ /0 ∙ 10$" +
20- uEF                      (8) 
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 = − 7
∑ 89	∙:9;<
=9>? ∙@<	
A< ⋅ y;< + ∑ *+ ∙ +$" +
,+- ∑ /0 ∙ 10$" +20- uEF               (9) 
  
Since it is a costly model in terms of parameter estimation, I restrict the parameters *+ to be 
equal across clubs. I also restrict the model to have only three (phase specific) constants instead of 
eight different (club) constants. Moreover, the interest lies in the initial income coefficients, and 
here the club effect is allowed. I prefer not to do a separate regression for each club since the panel 
data sample for each club becomes too small. 
4 Results 
The econometric tool employed is non-linear pooled OLS regressions for 32 countries for the 
period 1900 to 2007. The data description is in the Appendix. I report the coefficients, 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors (White, 1980) and other descriptive estimates, from 
Equations 2-5 in Table 1 and from Equations 6-9 in Table 2. 
From Table 1 we can see that the initial income coefficient, β, has almost the same rate in 
Equation 2 as in Equation 3: around 0.15%. However, in both cases we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that the β coefficient is zero (no convergence). When adding size and position, Equation 
2, the coefficient of the variable size is significant and negative, while the coefficient for the 
variable position is positive but insignificant. 
Equation 4 shows that each of the phase dummies is significantly different from the last phase 
(the omitted dummy). I also test whether both phase dummies are jointly significant in the equation 
(H₀: c₁=c₂=0). The test statistic is F=3.25, and we reject the null (at a level of 95% of confidence). 
The β coefficient is -0.65%, showing overall divergence. The coefficient of size remains negative, 
while position has changed to negative. Both variables are significant. 
Equation 5 substitutes the phase dummies for the club dummies, since the last ones include the 
first ones. Results are in the last column of Table 1. Regarding β, there is a significant negative 
coefficient, supporting divergence among all Latin American countries. This means that the relation 
between initial income and growth is positive once we take into account the effect of the different 
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clubs and initial conditions. All coefficients of club dummies are significant, except for the mineral 
countries. This is clear evidence that the club division is successful. The coefficients of all dummies 
are negative, which is just showing the differences in the constant term of the growth equation 
according to the clubs. Size and position retain negative signs. 
So far, I have shown that the division of phases and clubs is very important, and that there is 
significant divergence among all countries, after controlling for differences in initial conditions and 
membership in different clubs.   
The next task is to see whether contrary to the overall divergence picture there is in fact 
convergence inside each club. We proceed to calculate β convergence for each group. Table 2 
shows the results from estimations of Equations 6 to 9. 
Equation 6 is a similar version to Equation 2, in the sense that no controls are included. The 
results are presented Table 2. The βs for all clubs are significant and positive. This supports again 
the basic idea behind the paper, that there is club convergence, and the coefficients are significant. 
The positive sign of β means that there is a non-linear negative relation between initial income and 
growth. All coefficients are low and similar to each other, so I test whether the club dummy 
coefficients are significantly different from each other, and whether they are jointly significant. The 
F test is 3.54 for the first test indicates that we can reject the null with 95% confidence, and 
similarly, F=3.48 for the second test, which means that the dummies are jointly significant and 
different from each other. To control for more initial conditions, Equation 7 is estimated. The results 
in column 2 show that the βs remain similar, all positive and significant. I do the same tests as for 
Equation 5, and the results show that all βs are jointly significant and significantly different from 
each other. The coefficient for size is still negative and for position positive, but both insignificant. 
In general, the results show that the division by historical phases and clubs is important. When 
the club dummies were introduced in the specification, where it was assumed that β was common in 
the clubs, in Column 4 Table 1, the club dummies were significant, so that their inclusion was 
correct, and the β coefficient that relates initial income to growth was negative, which means 
divergence among all countries (confirming the impression in Figure 1). After allowing for 
heterogeneity in the non-linear relation between growth and initial income, in Table 2, there is 
enough evidence that the clubs show convergence. The βs for all clubs are significant and positive 
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as expected (Columns 1 and 2 in Table 2). When adding more controls, two of them become 
insignificant, the Caribbean and the high-reformers (Columns 3 and 4 in Table 2) in the last phase. 
The two variables besides income, used to control for differences in the initial conditions, size in 
terms of population, and position in the income distribution, show a negative relation with growth 
when significant (Columns 2 to 4 in Table 1). The rates of speeds of convergence are all around 
0.5% which is lower than the typical 2% found in the literature. The reason for this difference may 
lie in that I do not have as many controls for the steady state. 
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Table 1. Common β. Econometric results from estimations of Equations 2 to 5. Standard errors in brackets, 
*** significant with p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10, ++p<0.15 and +p<0.20. Phase 3 is omitted 
Variable Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5
Initial GDP 0.001 0.001  -0.006+  -0.007***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003]
Size  -0.002**  -0.002** 0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Position 0.003  -0.014*  -0.020***
[0.006] [0.008] [0.006]
Phase 1 0.012**
[0.006]
Phase 2 0.010**
[0.004]
Agricultural  -0.024***
[0.008]
Mineral  -0.019+
[0.014]
Caribbean 2  -0.011**
[0.006]
Reactive  -0.024***
[0.007]
Pasive  -0.027***
[0.006]
Caribbean 3  -0.029***
[0.010]
Low-reformers  -0.042***
[0.008]
High-reformers  -0.031***
[0.008]
Constant 0.027 0.054* -0.003
[0.021] [0.029] [0.042]
N 257 257 257 257
rss 0.118 0.116 0.113 0.108
R2 0.002 0.020 0.047 0.419
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Table 2. Different β rates. Econometric results of estimations of Equations 6 to 9. Same description as Table 1. 
Variable Equation 6 Equation 7 Equation 8 Equation 9
Initial GDP 
Mineral 0.004* 0.004* 0.000 -0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.006] [0.007]
Agricultural 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.001 0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.006] [0.008]
Caribbean 2 0.002* 0.002* 0.002** 0.002**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Reactive 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Pasive 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Caribbean 3 0.003*** 0.004** 0.001 0.000
[0.001] 0.002 0.004 0.005
Low-reformers 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.003 0.001
[0.001] [0.001] 0.004 0.006
High-reformers 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.001 0.000
[0.001] [0.001] 0.004 0.005
Size -0.001 -0.001
0.002 0.002
Position 0.003 -0.002
0.006 0.007
First Phase 0.021 0.029
0.041 0.064
Second Phase 0.055*** 0.064**
0.010 0.029
Third Phase 0.027 0.028
0.036 0.045
Constant 0.046*** 0.056**
0.009 0.028
N 257 257 257 257
rss 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.109
R2 0.076 0.078 0.415 0.416
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5 Strengths and Weaknesses of Approach 
Even though the results are quite satisfactory, there are caveats regarding the approach that need to 
be discussed. In this section I discuss the flaws of the current division of clubs, other possible ways 
of finding clubs, omitted variables, unbalanced panel data, and measurement errors. 
5.1 Division of Clubs 
The most controversial characteristic of this paper is the division of clubs. There could have been 
superior alternative ways to approach the division. 
Ideally, I could have determined structural breaks for the given time period of data for all 32 
countries. One way of doing this is following Bai (1997), who develops a method for finding 
multiple breaks. Another option is to analyze breaks for each country and see if there were common 
breaks. Astorga et al. (2005) do this for six countries over 100 years, using the Chow test. Table 1 in 
their paper shows the different structural breaks by country. These shocks account for external and 
internal events, like revolutions, dictatorships, and country specific characteristics. At the end, the 
authors do a panel data analysis where they recognize that the major events for all countries were 
the crisis of 1929 and its aftermath in 1930, along with the debt crises in the 1980s. Instead, I let 
historians decide the breaks, and, after all, the breaks are similar to the ones in Astorga et al. (2005). 
Moreover, the significance statistical tests on the phase dummies prove that the breaks are relevant. 
Similarly, regarding the clubs, I could have chosen many other ways of dividing countries into 
clubs. Canova (2004) argues that the initial distribution of income per capita, the initial level of 
human capital, and human capital within the country could be used as economic causes of 
heterogeneity. In addition, he says, geography/location can be used to measure the neighborhood 
externalities, and policy variables could measure national effects. 
Given that the data are limited, I am not able to use more variables than the ones I have already 
used. I could have had more variables but for fewer countries, which would change the essence of 
the paper. I did try to group countries according to geography: Caribbean, Central and South 
American clubs. The results showed divergence. I also tried to divide the countries according to 
economic integration and had no success (in Barrientos, 2010) because integration in Latin America 
is not yet well developed. This is not enough evidence to claim superiority over other ways of 
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dividing countries into clubs, but it is appealing to have another way of diving into clubs than those 
already known. 
It is worth noting that the division of clubs by economic history has flaws. The clubs in the 
paper are presented as independent from each other. However, clubs in each phase depend on clubs 
in previous phases. Many countries may not be able to make a "fresh start" at every historical 
juncture.  Moreover, the division of phase one, which is by resources, is still very important in later 
phases, as noted by Acemoglu et.al (2001) and Engerman and Sokoloff (2002). 
5.2 Omitted Variables 
This paper studies more countries and years than any other study. However, this imposes 
restrictions in terms of the possibility of adding more variables. I could have restricted the analysis 
into fewer countries, fewer years, and more variables. However, the essence of this paper is the 
inclusion of as many countries and as many years as possible to analyze historical events and use 
these events in a way that maybe variables would inform. Still missing variables is a problem in this 
approach, which means that the results may be biased and inconsistent.  
Nevertheless, as mentioned before, including proxies for the steady state introduce endogeneity 
problems and the results can be hard to interpret in the sense that the inclusion of more controls, will 
tell us less about the true convergence. β convergence tells us about poor countries growing faster 
than rich ones, conditional on the controls. So intuitively, when adding controls, we will most likely 
find high rates of convergence but these will probably be artificial. 
5.3 Unbalanced Panel and Measurement error 
The data is an unbalanced panel, where some countries do not have information, especially for the 
first years. This can be a problem if the reason for missing information is related to the error term, 
but since the reason here is connected to the regressor (initial output per capita), having unbalanced 
panel data is not a problem. 
Another concern is the temporal measurement error that can lead to inflated convergence rates. 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) show in their appendix that measurement error is unlikely to be 
important, results seem to be similar. Here I use the same setting as in their article with the 
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difference that I use more homogenous countries. So I rely in their results and arguments for not 
worrying for measurement errors, as they do. 
6   Conclusions 
This article investigates and connects the economic history of Latin America, reflected into the 
analysis of external shocks, trends and ideologies, as sources of heterogeneity in the growth process 
and club formation in Latin America. First, I identify two main common external shocks to the 
region: the Great Depression in the 1930s and the oil price shock in 1974. Then I classify countries 
in clubs according to their policy-response to the shocks. I focus on a criterion to divide countries 
into clubs that describe the initial conditions after the shocks. The criterion is based on the policies 
adopted at the beginning of each phase, as a response to the shock. I focus on information on 
policies rather than outcomes so the results are not driven by the selection of the club thresholds in 
the first place. 
Before 1930, I define two clubs: the minerals and agricultural. After the Great Depression I 
follow Diaz (1984) classification of clubs according to passive or reactive, where the reactive 
responded autonomously to protect themselves, while the passive did/could not. After the oil price 
shock, I classify the clubs according to the Lora index, which describes how far countries applied 
structural reforms to liberalize their economies. I also include the Caribbean countries as a separate 
club. 
In general, the results show that the division of phases and clubs is important. When the club 
dummies were introduced in the specification with a common β coefficient, Column 4 in Table 1, 
the club dummies were significant, so that their inclusion was correct, and the β coefficient that 
relates initial income to growth was negative, which means divergence among all countries 
(confirming the impression from Figure 1). When allowing for heterogeneity in the β coefficients, 
there is evidence that the clubs show convergence. The βs for all clubs are significant and positive 
as expected (Columns 1 and 2 in Table 2). When adding more controls, two of the club βs become 
insignificant, the Caribbean and the high-reformers (Columns 4 and 5 in Table 2), in the last phase, 
but the overall impression is still one of club convergence, and the βs are jointly significant.  
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Regarding policy implications, I find that the clubs to which countries appertain, are determined 
by policy makers but also by external shocks and natural resources endowments. I cannot conclude 
that one club is superior than another, because successful countries belong to different clubs. 
Therefore, I cannot suggest how to jump to a superior club, as is suggested in a traditional approach, 
where clubs are defined by income or capital thresholds which imply that a significant transfer of 
money would help a country jump to a superior club. 
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Appendix 
Data 
The analysis covers 32 countries, listed in Table 3, for the period 1900-2007. The potential number 
of observations is 3,456, but due to incomplete data for some countries, the number of real 
observations is reduced to 2,209.  
The main variable is the GDP per capita measured in constant 1990 International (Geary-
Khamis) dollars. This measure allows for comparison of standards of living of the countries; it takes 
into account the purchasing power parity of currencies and the international commodity prices. The 
sources are the Madison database (2003) and the World Bank (2004). The final data base has 
information from the Madison database (M) (from 1900 until 1989) and from the World Bank 
database (W) (from 1990 to 2007). 
A converter factor (C) is calculated as: C₍₁₉₉₀₎=M₍₁₉₉₀₎/W₍₁₉₉₀₎ for each year and is kept 
constant from 1995. Then C is multiplied by the existent W. In the case of ten small Caribbean 
countries, M has no data, so C is taken constant, for the year 1995, from another country that 
heavily influenced these economies and is assumed to have a similar C. The one from USA is used 
for The Bahamas; from Great Britain for Barbados and Belize; from Haiti for Dominica St.Kitts and 
Nevis, St. Lucia, St.Vincent and the Grenadines; from Colombia for Guyana, and finally from The 
Dominican Republic for Grenada. In the case of Cuba, the available GDP from W was measured in 
constant 2000 local currency. Here, C was calculated with that kind of data and kept constant for the  
year  2001. The transformed data go from 2001 to 2007.     
The panel data were created by taking averages or the values of variables in subperiods of 
different lenght. The choice for different lengths is to take advantage of the data and coincide with 
the phase years.  
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Table 3. Description of observations in data set. 
 
Country Observations Missing 
observations 
Starting 
year
Ending 
year
Argentina 108 0 1900 2007 
The Bahamas 28 80 1975 2002 
Belize 33 75 1975 2007 
Bolivia 63 45 1945 2007 
Brazil 108 0 1900 2007 
 Barbados 25 83 1975 1999 
Chile 108 0 1900 2007 
Colombia 108 0 1900 2007 
Costa Rica 88 20 1920 2007 
Cuba 76 32 1929 2004 
Dominica 31 77 1977 2007 
Dominican Republic 58 50 1950 2007 
Ecuador 69 39 1939 2007 
Grenada 28 80 1980 2007 
Guatemala 88 20 1920 2007 
Guyana 33 75 1975 2007 
Honduras 88 20 1920 2007 
Haiti 63 45 1945 2007 
Jamaica 64 44 1913 2007 
St. Kitts and Nevis 31 77 1977 2007 
St. Lucia 28 80 1980 2007 
Mexico 108 0 1900 2007 
Nicaragua 88 20 1920 2007 
Panama 63 45 1945 2007 
Peru 108 0 1900 2007 
Puerto Rico 52 56 1950 2001 
Paraguay 69 39 1939 2007 
El Salvador 88 20 1920 2007 
Trinidad and Tobago 58 50 1950 2007 
Uruguay 108 0 1900 2007 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 33 75 1975 2007 
Venezuela 108 0 1900 2007 
Total 2,209 1,247
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countries1 ly lppl pos countries1 ly lppl pos
arg mean 8.57 16.64 0.78 hnd mean 7.33 14.39 0.20
sd 0.36 0.60 0.20 sd 0.20 0.82 0.08
max 9.27 17.49 1.00 max 7.62 15.79 0.42
min 7.91 15.36 0.47 min 6.91 13.12 0.10
obs 108 108 108 obs 88 108 88
bhs mean 9.43 12.30 0.96 hti mean 6.88 15.11 0.09
sd 0.13 0.30 0.06 sd 0.15 0.54 0.03
max 9.54 12.72 1.00 max 7.17 16.09 0.20
min 9.05 11.66 0.80 min 6.61 14.26 0.04
obs 28 47 28 obs 63 108 63
blz mean 8.08 12.02 0.24 jam mean 7.94 14.18 0.27
sd 0.32 0.34 0.05 sd 0.41 0.43 0.05
max 8.57 12.65 0.33 max 8.33 14.80 0.39
min 7.64 11.45 0.17 min 6.41 13.49 0.16
obs 33 47 33 obs 64 108 64
bol mean 7.67 15.07 0.20 kna mean 8.13 10.70 0.26
sd 0.17 0.51 0.04 sd 0.47 0.06 0.09
max 7.96 16.07 0.33 max 8.74 10.83 0.39
min 7.36 14.34 0.14 min 7.33 10.60 0.14
obs 63 108 63 obs 31 47 31
bra mean 7.61 17.92 0.30 lca mean 7.62 11.72 0.15
sd 0.74 0.74 0.07 sd 0.30 0.20 0.04
max 8.76 19.06 0.43 max 7.92 12.03 0.20
min 6.52 16.70 0.20 min 7.03 11.38 0.10
obs 108 108 108 obs 28 47 28
brb mean 9.13 12.42 0.73 mex mean 8.02 17.33 0.44
sd 0.12 0.03 0.05 sd 0.57 0.71 0.07
max 9.33 12.47 0.81 max 8.94 18.47 0.64
min 8.90 12.35 0.63 min 7.21 16.43 0.29
obs 25 47 25 obs 108 108 108
chl mean 8.32 15.74 0.60 nic mean 7.45 14.19 0.23
sd 0.49 0.54 0.13 sd 0.30 0.83 0.09
max 9.48 16.63 1.00 max 8.12 15.54 0.40
min 7.58 14.91 0.37 min 6.91 13.08 0.07
obs 108 108 108 obs 88 108 88
col mean 7.77 16.43 0.34 pan mean 8.25 13.79 0.35
sd 0.57 0.74 0.05 sd 0.42 0.77 0.07
max 8.79 17.61 0.46 max 9.01 15.02 0.45
min 6.88 15.20 0.24 min 7.52 12.48 0.23
obs 108 108 108 obs 63 108 63
cri mean 8.01 13.88 0.37 per mean 7.70 16.06 0.32
sd 0.50 0.87 0.06 sd 0.55 0.66 0.06
max 8.89 15.31 0.47 max 8.49 17.17 0.47
min 7.26 12.60 0.24 min 6.71 15.15 0.21
obs 88 108 88 obs 108 108 108
cub mean 7.63 15.54 0.24 pri mean 8.76 14.58 0.62
sd 0.26 0.59 0.07 sd 0.57 0.43 0.23
max 8.02 16.23 0.43 max 9.66 15.19 1.00
min 6.88 14.32 0.15 min 7.67 13.77 0.29
obs 76 108 76 obs 52 108 52
dma mean 7.55 11.16 0.14 pry mean 7.72 14.30 0.23
sd 0.29 0.05 0.03 sd 0.31 0.79 0.07
max 7.90 11.22 0.19 max 8.16 15.63 0.44
min 6.93 11.02 0.08 min 7.31 12.99 0.15
obs 31 47 31 obs 69 108 69
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Table 4. Description of observations in data set by country, where ly is the logarithm of GDP per capita, lppl is the logarithm of 
population and pos is the position of country with respect to the richest country.  
 
 
  
countries1 ly lppl pos countries1 ly lppl pos
dom mean 7.63 14.74 0.18 slv mean 7.44 14.67 0.21
sd 0.41 0.92 0.04 sd 0.39 0.67 0.04
max 8.40 16.10 0.27 max 7.99 15.62 0.30
min 6.93 13.15 0.13 min 6.71 13.55 0.14
obs 58 108 58 obs 88 108 88
ecu mean 7.97 15.19 0.28 tto mean 9.08 13.40 0.78
sd 0.40 0.75 0.04 sd 0.41 0.53 0.16
max 8.50 16.41 0.36 max 9.95 14.10 1.00
min 7.17 14.15 0.21 min 8.21 12.50 0.46
obs 69 108 69 obs 58 108 58
grd mean 8.02 11.48 0.22 ury mean 8.40 14.56 0.66
sd 0.28 0.04 0.05 sd 0.37 0.39 0.17
max 8.35 11.54 0.30 max 9.14 15.02 1.00
min 7.50 11.39 0.14 min 7.70 13.73 0.40
obs 28 47 28 obs 108 108 108
gtm mean 7.81 15.09 0.31 vct mean 7.52 11.51 0.14
sd 0.31 0.75 0.11 sd 0.33 0.09 0.03
max 8.22 16.41 0.66 max 8.06 11.60 0.18
min 7.15 14.08 0.18 min 6.85 11.32 0.09
obs 88 108 88 obs 33 47 33
guy mean 8.04 13.50 0.23 ven mean 8.40 15.75 0.70
sd 0.11 0.07 0.03 sd 0.93 0.81 0.28
max 8.23 13.57 0.28 max 9.33 17.13 1.00
min 7.84 13.28 0.18 min 6.68 14.75 0.23
obs 33 47 33 obs 108 108 108
Total mean 7.96 14.68 0.38
sd 0.67 1.70 0.24
max 9.95 19.06 1.00
min 6.41 10.60 0.04
obs 2209 2907 2209
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Table 5. Clubs in phase 1. ly is the logarithm of GDP per capita, lppl is the logarithm of population and pos is the position of country 
with respect to the richest country.  
 
  
Mineral Agricultural
countries1 ly lppl pos countries1 ly lppl pos
chl mean 7.80 15.09 0.70 arg mean 8.17 15.86 1.00
sd 0.15 0.12 0.08 sd 0.13 0.28 0.01
max 8.13 15.29 1.00 max 8.38 16.29 1.00
min 7.58 14.91 0.59 min 7.91 15.36 0.95
obs 31 31 31 obs 31 31 31
mex mean 7.44 16.53 0.49 bra mean 6.75 17.02 0.24
sd 0.10 0.06 0.05 sd 0.16 0.19 0.03
max 7.60 16.66 0.64 max 7.05 17.33 0.30
min 7.21 16.43 0.38 min 6.52 16.70 0.20
obs 31 31 31 obs 31 31 31
per mean 6.98 15.31 0.31 col mean 7.09 15.53 0.34
sd 0.19 0.10 0.05 sd 0.11 0.21 0.03
max 7.39 15.50 0.43 max 7.32 15.88 0.46
min 6.71 15.15 0.25 min 6.88 15.20 0.30
obs 31 31 31 obs 31 31 31
ven mean 7.09 14.88 0.37 cri mean 7.40 12.88 0.42
sd 0.46 0.07 0.17 sd 0.05 0.15 0.04
max 8.14 15.01 0.80 max 7.50 13.12 0.47
min 6.68 14.75 0.23 min 7.33 12.60 0.36
obs 31 31 31 obs 11 31 11
cub mean 7.36 14.76 0.36
sd 0.06 0.26 0.02
max 7.40 15.16 0.38
min 7.32 14.32 0.35
obs 2 31 2
gtm mean 7.30 14.23 0.38
sd 0.10 0.09 0.02
max 7.48 14.39 0.41
min 7.15 14.08 0.36
obs 11 31 11
slv mean 6.89 13.87 0.25 hnd mean 7.20 13.43 0.34
sd 0.06 0.19 0.01 sd 0.10 0.19 0.03
max 6.97 14.18 0.27 max 7.35 13.76 0.37
min 6.82 13.55 0.22 min 7.04 13.12 0.28
obs 11 31 11 obs 11 31 11
ury mean 7.99 14.03 0.84 nic mean 7.22 13.28 0.35
sd 0.17 0.20 0.07 sd 0.12 0.11 0.03
max 8.37 14.35 1.00 max 7.47 13.43 0.40
min 7.70 13.73 0.67 min 7.08 13.08 0.30
obs 31 31 31 obs 11 31 11
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Table 6. Clubs in phase 2. ly is the logarithm of GDP per capita, lppl is the logarithm of population and pos is the position of country with respect to 
the richest country.  
Reactive Pasive
countries1 ly lppl pos countries1 ly lppl pos
arg mean 8.55 16.70 0.77 cub mean 7.50 15.61 0.27
sd 0.23 0.23 0.17 sd 0.23 0.27 0.06
max 9.03 17.06 1.00 max 7.79 16.05 0.43
min 8.17 16.31 0.52 min 6.88 15.18 0.18
obs 44 44 44 obs 44 44 44
bol mean 7.53 14.96 0.21 dom mean 7.22 14.75 0.15
sd 0.12 0.19 0.04 sd 0.18 0.43 0.02
max 7.79 15.35 0.33 max 7.63 15.45 0.20
min 7.36 14.70 0.16 min 6.93 14.08 0.13
obs 30 44 30 obs 25 44 25
bra mean 7.51 17.89 0.27 ecu mean 7.64 15.09 0.27
sd 0.38 0.35 0.04 sd 0.27 0.37 0.03
max 8.31 18.48 0.39 max 8.13 15.72 0.36
min 6.91 17.35 0.20 min 7.17 14.51 0.21
obs 44 44 44 obs 36 44 36
chl mean 8.27 15.70 0.58 gtm mean 7.71 14.98 0.34
sd 0.22 0.26 0.13 sd 0.21 0.38 0.13
max 8.64 16.14 0.81 max 8.10 15.61 0.66
min 7.73 15.30 0.42 min 7.21 14.41 0.22
obs 44 44 44 obs 44 44 44
col mean 7.71 16.38 0.33 hnd mean 7.20 14.30 0.20
sd 0.23 0.34 0.07 sd 0.14 0.36 0.07
max 8.19 16.97 0.46 max 7.40 14.92 0.42
min 7.28 15.90 0.24 min 6.91 13.79 0.14
obs 44 44 44 obs 44 44 44
cri mean 7.75 13.78 0.34 hti mean 6.91 15.03 0.12
sd 0.33 0.45 0.07 sd 0.07 0.22 0.03
max 8.40 14.51 0.46 max 7.01 15.44 0.20
min 7.26 13.14 0.24 min 6.76 14.71 0.08
obs 44 44 44 obs 30 44 30
mex mean 7.87 17.23 0.38 pan mean 7.87 13.76 0.30
sd 0.35 0.37 0.06 sd 0.28 0.34 0.06
max 8.52 17.87 0.49 max 8.35 14.33 0.41
min 7.22 16.68 0.29 min 7.52 13.17 0.23
obs 44 44 44 obs 30 44 30
nic mean 7.51 14.05 0.27 pri mean 8.28 14.60 0.44
sd 0.33 0.45 0.05 sd 0.40 0.17 0.14
max 8.08 14.81 0.40 max 8.90 14.89 0.69
min 6.91 13.44 0.20 min 7.67 14.28 0.29
obs 44 44 44 obs 25 44 25
per mean 7.81 15.95 0.36 slv mean 7.31 14.62 0.22
sd 0.34 0.30 0.06 sd 0.32 0.34 0.03
max 8.34 16.51 0.47 max 7.80 15.24 0.30
min 7.05 15.51 0.28 min 6.71 14.19 0.17
obs 44 44 44 obs 44 44 44
pry mean 7.44 14.26 0.23
sd 0.09 0.34 0.09
max 7.67 14.82 0.44
min 7.31 13.71 0.16
obs 36 44 36
ury mean 8.38 14.64 0.65 ven mean 8.79 15.58 0.96
sd 0.19 0.15 0.15 sd 0.47 0.43 0.08
max 8.59 14.85 0.94 max 9.28 16.32 1.00
min 7.92 14.37 0.46 min 7.87 15.02 0.74
obs 44 44 44 obs 44 44 44
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Table 6. Clubs in phase 3. ly is the logarithm of GDP per capita, lppl is the logarithm of population and pos is the position of country with respect to 
the richest country.  
Low Reformers High Reformers
countries1 ly lppl pos countries1 ly lppl pos
bra mean 8.55 18.82 0.38 arg mean 8.98 17.30 0.59
sd 0.09 0.17 0.03 sd 0.11 0.13 0.08
max 8.76 19.06 0.43 max 9.27 17.49 0.78
min 8.34 18.50 0.30 min 8.77 17.07 0.47
obs 33 33 33 obs 33 33 33
col mean 8.48 17.32 0.35 bol mean 7.80 15.73 0.18
sd 0.15 0.19 0.04 sd 0.09 0.21 0.03
max 8.79 17.61 0.44 max 7.96 16.07 0.24
min 8.19 16.99 0.31 min 7.64 15.38 0.14
obs 33 33 33 obs 33 33 33
cri mean 8.55 14.95 0.38 chl mean 8.88 16.41 0.54
sd 0.15 0.24 0.04 sd 0.34 0.15 0.13
max 8.89 15.31 0.46 max 9.48 16.63 0.73
min 8.35 14.53 0.31 min 8.37 16.16 0.37
obs 33 33 33 obs 33 33 33
cub mean 7.84 16.17 0.20 pan mean 8.59 14.71 0.39
sd 0.15 0.06 0.03 sd 0.17 0.20 0.03
max 8.02 16.23 0.24 max 9.01 15.02 0.45
min 7.52 16.06 0.15 min 8.32 14.36 0.31
obs 30 33 30 obs 33 33 33
dom mean 7.93 15.82 0.21 pri mean 9.21 15.08 0.79
sd 0.22 0.19 0.03 sd 0.24 0.08 0.16
max 8.40 16.10 0.27 max 9.66 15.19 1.00
min 7.66 15.48 0.17 min 8.85 14.91 0.61
obs 33 33 33 obs 27 33 27
ecu mean 8.32 16.13 0.30 pry mean 8.03 15.27 0.23
sd 0.08 0.20 0.03 sd 0.10 0.24 0.03
max 8.50 16.41 0.35 max 8.16 15.63 0.28
min 8.15 15.75 0.23 min 7.71 14.85 0.15
obs 33 33 33 obs 33 33 33
gtm mean 8.11 16.02 0.25 ury mean 8.83 14.95 0.50
sd 0.07 0.23 0.04 sd 0.15 0.05 0.06
max 8.22 16.41 0.32 max 9.14 15.02 0.62
min 7.98 15.64 0.18 min 8.60 14.86 0.40
obs 33 33 33 obs 33 33 33
hnd mean 7.54 15.41 0.14
sd 0.05 0.26 0.02
max 7.62 15.79 0.17
min 7.36 14.95 0.10
obs 33 33 33
mex mean 8.75 18.23 0.47
sd 0.10 0.18 0.04
max 8.94 18.47 0.55
min 8.55 17.89 0.36
obs 33 33 33
nic mean 7.46 15.24 0.14 slv mean 7.80 15.49 0.18
sd 0.28 0.21 0.06 sd 0.12 0.11 0.03
max 8.12 15.54 0.30 max 7.99 15.62 0.24
min 7.18 14.84 0.07 min 7.64 15.26 0.14
obs 33 33 33 obs 33 33 33
per mean 8.22 16.89 0.28 ven mean 9.11 16.80 0.68
sd 0.13 0.19 0.05 sd 0.11 0.23 0.16
max 8.49 17.17 0.40 max 9.33 17.13 1.00
min 7.96 16.53 0.21 min 8.85 16.36 0.43
obs 33 33 33 obs 33 33 33
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Table 7. Description of subperiods of panel data. First line is the initial year, second line is the ending year, 
and the last line is M.      
  
1 7
t0: 1900 t0: 1959
t1: 1919 t1: 1965
τ: 20 τ: 7
2 8
t0: 1920 t0: 1966
t1: 1930 t1: 1974
τ: 11 τ: 9
3 9
t0: 1931 t0: 1975
t1: 1937 t1: 1981
τ: 7 τ: 7
4 10
t0: 1938 t0: 1982
t1: 1944 t1: 1988
τ: 7 τ: 7
5 11
t0: 1945 t0: 1989
t1: 1951 t1: 1996
τ: 7 τ: 8
6 12
t0: 1952 t0: 1997
t1: 1958 t1: 2007
τ: 7 τ: 11
Subperiods
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